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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case arises out of a divorce proceeding wherein Petitioner / Respondent,
Charlie Smith, hereinafter "Charlie," filed a Petition to Modify Order Pursuant to Rule
809 (e.g. I.R.F.L.P. 809) to modify a provision in a previous Order regarding a parcel of
real property located in the state of Utah, hereinafter "Salt Lake Property," in which title
was held by a California Corporation, Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. at the time of the
parties' divorce. The magistrate court granted Charlie's Motion and appointed a receiver
to convey title to an Idaho limited liability company owned by the parties at the time of
their divorce, and sell the Salt Lake Property.
Respondent I Appellant, Ballard Smith, hereinafter "Ballard," contends on appeal
that the magistrate court had no jurisdiction over the Salt Lake Property as neither party
had an interest in the Salt Lake Property during the parties' marriage because Sun
Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. owned the Salt Lake Property during the parties' entire
marriage. Ballard is requesting that the Idaho Supreme Court reverse the district court's
ruling affirming the magistrate court's decision, that the judgments and orders entered by
the magistrate court be vacated, and that Charlie's Second Amended Petition to Modify
Pursuant to Rule 809 be dismissed.
B.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE MAGISTRATE COURT
Ballard and Charlie were divorced on April 14, 2003. (R. p. 79). A Rule 54(b)
Certificate was attached making the divorce final as there were still community and
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separate property issues remaining to be resolved. (R. pp. 79 - 84). On June 28, 2005, a
Final Order was entered. (R. p. 139). The Final Order was silent as to Sun Mountain
Broadcasting, Inc. The Final Order did refer to Salt Lake Property as 48 acres owned by
BC Realty. No address and/or legal description was set forth in the Final Order to
identify the Salt Lake Property. (R. p. 158).
On April 20, 2007, the parties stipulated on the record that Ballard would assign
the stock he held in Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. to B & C Realty, LLC. (R. p. 493,
p. 21, LL 5 - 9). On May 14, 2007, the magistrate court filed an Order Re: April 20, 2007
Hearing, hereinafter "2007 Order," that did not accurately reflect the stipulation placed on
the record by the parties. (R. pp. 215 - 217). On October 23, 2008, the magistrate court
filed an Order Dismissing Contempts and Modifying Order Re: April 20, 2007 Hearing,
hereinafter "2008 Order." (R. pp. 220 - 223). Approximately five (5) years later, Charlie
filed her Petition to Modify Order Pursuant to Rule 809 seeking to have the 2008 Order
modified in regard to the Salt Lake Property. (R. pp. 230 - 231 ). Trial was held on June
15, 2015 on Charlie's first Petition to Modify. The trial was continued after substantial
testimony was taken. A year and a half later, Charlie filed her Second Amended Petition
to Modify Order Pursuant to Rule 809 again seeking relief solely as to the Salt Lake
Property. (R. pp. 280 - 281).
A three (3) day trial was held in April, 2017. On January 29, 2018, the magistrate
court filed its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. pp. 291 - 310). On March
23, 2018, the magistrate court filed a Judgment and an Order Re: Receiver Duties. (R.
pp. 315 - 320, pp. 583 - 590). Ballard filed his Notice of Appeal on March 30, 2018. (R.
pp. 322 - 326). On July 16, 2018, the magistrate court filed its Judgment for Attorney
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Fees and Costs. (R. pp. 334 - 335). Ballard filed his Second Amended Notice of Appeal
on July 18, 2018. (R. pp. 336 - 340).
C.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT
On January 25, 2019, the district court filed its Opinion on Appeal affirming the
magistrate court's decision. (R. pp. 341 - 386). On March 5, 2019, Ballard filed his
Notice of Appeal. (R. pp. 387 - 390). On March 18, 2019, the district court filed its
Judgment for Attorney Fees. (R. pp. 437 - 438).
D.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Ballard acquired his interest in Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc., a

California Corporation, in 1985. (T. p. 554, LL 8 - 10, p. 498, L. 3 - p. 499, L. 21 ).
Ballard was not the only shareholder. (R. p. 451; Respondent's Exhibits YY and ZZ).
2.

Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. acquired the Salt Lake Property on

August 1, 1985 pursuant to a Warranty Deed. (R. pp. 320 - 321).
3.

Ballard and Charlie were married on January 23, 1988. (R. p. 72).

4.

On the day of the parties' divorce (e.g. April 14, 2003), Sun Mountain

Broadcasting, Inc. owned the Salt Lake Property. (R. p. 493, p. 20, LL 17 - 21 ).
5.

The Salt Lake Property has never been owned by either party individually,

or as community property. (R. p. 493, p. 20, LL 20 - 21). Judge Day ruled the Salt Lake
Property was not community property as it was owned by Sun Mountain Broadcasting,
Inc.
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6.

Ballard's interest in Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. was acquired by him

prior to marriage and is his separate property. The magistrate court in this action has
never adjudicated that Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. was community property.
7.

Ballard and Charlie both stipulated under oath at the April 20, 2007

hearing as follows:
The parties, by their stipulation, have agreed that I can enter an order
that Ballard will assign all of that stock to B & C Realty, LLC; and then B
& C Realty, LLC will be wound up to the extent possible and the assets
sold. (Emphasis added).

(R. p. 493, p. 21, LI. 5 - 9; p. 22, L. 16 - p. 25, L. 22).
8.

Charlie testified she never paid any portion of the property taxes owed

against the Salt Lake Property, despite the fact that the rent was not enough to cover the
property taxes that accrued on the Salt Lake Property from the date of the parties' divorce
on April 14, 2003 through 2012. (T. p. 372, LI. 9 - 20, Respondent's Exhibit KK, p. 32,
L. 16 - p. 33, L. 13; p. 36, L. 23 - p. 37, L. 4).
9.

On May 17, 2013, Ballard sent a letter to Charlie's attorney requesting

payment of Charlie's share of the property tax deficiency. (T. p. 372, LI. 17 - 21, Exhibit
KK, p. 35, L. 17 - p. 36, L. 20, Ex. 10). Charlie never filed an Objection with the Court
as required by the Order Dismissing Contempts and Modifying Order Re: April 20, 2007
Hearing (hereinafter "2008 Order"), paragraph 3.c.
10.

On July 10 and 22 of2013 and on October 30, 2013, Ballard sent letters to

Stan Welsh pursuant to paragraph 3.b. of the 2008 Order (Petitioner's Exhibits 267, 269
and 272). Charlie failed to file a Motion with the Court objecting to the costs pursuant to
paragraph 3.c. of the 2008 Order. Charlie never paid any of the costs.
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11 .

Ballard wrote numerous letters to Stan Welsh regarding a listing

agreement for the Salt Lake Property pursuant to paragraph 3.d. of the 2008 Order.
Letters were sent on May 17, 2013 (Petitioner's Exhibit 264), July 10, 2013 (Petitioner's
Exhibit 267), September 19, 2013 (Petitioner's Exhibit 271). Charlie never filed a
Motion with the Court objecting to the listing agreement as required by paragraph 3.d. of
the 2008 Order.
12.

On December 17, 2008, Charlie unlawfully filed a Claim oflnterest

against the Salt Lake Property without Ballard's knowledge slandering the title to the Salt
Lake Property. (Respondent's Exhibit "D"). Her action in filing the Claim of Interest
prevented the property from being sold as it clouded title to the property.
13.

Charlie, without Ballard's knowledge, obtained an appraisal on the Salt

Lake Property on May 13, 2015 from Larry Rigby. The appraisal valued the Salt Lake
Property at $900,000.00. (T. p. 373, p. 8 - p. 375, L. 11).
14.

An offer was made by a third party to purchase the Salt Lake Property in

late 2015 for $825,000.00 and a Commitment for Title Insurance was issued.
(Respondent's Exhibit I). Because of Charlie's Claim of Interest, the sale of the property
could not close. On March 8, 2017, a demand was sent to Charlie to release the Claim of
Interest (Respondent's Exhibit K). Charlie recorded a Release of Claim of Interest on
March 17, 2017. (Respondent's Exhibit X).
15.

S & R Realty, LLC, a Utah Limited Liability Company, held title to the

Salt Lake Property as of November 13, 2012. (Petitioner's Exhibit 25).
16.

On March 4, 2013, S & R Realty, LLC sold 4.5 acres to BZW

Investments, L.P. for $224,250.00. Of that sum, $106,886.83 was paid for back property
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taxes for years 2008 through 2012 and prorated property taxes to March 4, 2013. A real
estate commission of $13,455.00 was also paid. (Petitioner's Exhibit 209).
17.

Charlie testified she had no evidence Ballard was involved in any side

deals with a third party in regard to his efforts to sell the Salt Lake Property. (T. p. 377,
LL 9 - 14; T. p. 380, LL 11 - 15).
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the district court err as a matter of law when it affirmed the magistrate court's
decision that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the Salt Lake Property.

2.

Did the district court err as a matter of law when it affirmed the magistrate court's
exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc, B &
C Realty, LLC and S & R Realty, LLC.

3.

Did the district court err as a matter of law when it affirmed the magistrate court's
decision that Ballard was judicially estopped from raising jurisdictional issues.

4.

Did the district court err as a matter of law when it affirmed the magistrate court's
decision by ruling the Salt Lake Property was community property.

5.

Did the district court err by affirming the magistrate court's decision to grant
Charlie relief that she never plead for and/or requested.

6.

Did the district court err as a matter of law when it affirmed the magistrate court's
determination of ownership interests in the Salt Lake Property.

7.

Did the district court err when it affirmed the magistrate court's appointment of a
receiver.

8.

Did the district court err when it affirmed the magistrate court's entry of a
judgment against Ballard for one-half of the sale price of 4.5 acres.

9.

Did the district court err when it affirmed the magistrate court's award of
attorney's fees to Charlie.

10.

Did the district court err when it upheld the magistrate court's consideration of
three (3) separate memorandums of costs and subsequent award of discretionary
costs.

11.

Did the district court err when it awarded Charlie attorney's fees on appeal.

12.

Is Ballard entitled to attorney's fees on appeal.
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ARGUMENT

I.
STANDARD ON APPEAL
A.

Standard of review on appeal from district court sitting in its capacity as an
appellate court.
In Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855,303 P.3d 214 (2013), the Idaho Supreme

Court held:
When this Court reviews the decision of a district court sitting in its
capacity as an appellate court, the standard of review is as follows:
The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to
determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to
support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's
conclusions of law follow from those findings. If those findings are so
supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court
affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affirm the district court's decision
as a matter of procedure.

Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526,529,284 P.3d 970,973 (2012)
(quoting Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670,672, 183 P.3d 758, 760
(2008)). Thus, this Court does not review the decision of the magistrate
court. Id. "Rather, we are 'procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the
decisions of the district court."' Id. (quoting State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413,
415 n. 1,224 P.3d 480,482 n. 1 (2009)).
154 Idaho at 858 - 859. In Estate of Conway. 152 Idaho 933,277 P.3d 380 (2012), the
Idaho Supreme Court held:
"On appeal of a decision rendered by a district court while acting in its
intermediate appellate capacity, the Court directly reviews the district
court's decision." In re Doe, 147 Idaho 243,248,207 P.3d 974,979
(2009). However, to determine whether the district court erred in
affirming the magistrate court, independent review of the record before the
magistrate court is necessary. Id.
152 Idaho at 938.
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The Supreme Court freely reviews issues of law. Caldwell v. Cornetta, 151 Idaho
34, 38, 253 P.3d 708, 712(2011).
B.

Subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time.
In State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158,244 P.3d 1244 (2010), the Idaho Supreme

Court held:
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to determine cases over a
general type or class of dispute." Bach v. Miller, 144 Idaho 142, 145, 158
P.3d 305,308 (2007). The source of this power comes from Article V,
Section 20, of the Idaho Constitution, which provides that district courts
"shall have original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in equity, and
such appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred by law." IDAHO
CONST., art. V, § 20. This issue is so fundamental to the propriety of a
court's actions, that subject matter jurisdiction can never be waived or
consented to, and a court has a sua sponte duty to ensure that it has subject
matter jurisdiction over a case. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 12(g)(4).
Furthermore, judgments and orders made without subject matter
jurisdiction are void and "are subject to collateral attack, and are not
entitled to recognition in other states under the full faith and credit clause
of the United States Constitution." Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, 99
Idaho 624, 626-27, 586 P.2d 1068, 1070-71 (1978). This Court exercises
free review over questions ofjurisdiction. Doe, 147 Idaho at 327, 208
P.3d at 731. (Emphasis added).
150 Idaho at 162 - 163. See also, Minor Miracle Production, LLC v. Starkey. 152 Idaho
333,271 P.3d 1189 (2012); Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 149 Idaho 623,
238 P.3d 223 (2010). In H.F.L.P .• LLC v. City of Twin Falls, 157 Idaho 672, 339 P.3d
557 (2014), the Idaho Supreme Court held:
"Questions of jurisdiction must be addressed prior to reaching the
merits of an appeal." Bach v. Miller, 144 Idaho 142, 144-45, 158 P.3d
305, 307-08 (2007). Whether the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction is a question of law over which this Court exercises free
review. Id. at 145, 158 P.3d at 308.
157 Idaho at 678.
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In Paslay v. A & B Irrigation District, 162 Idaho 866, 406 P.3d 878 (2017), the
Idaho Supreme Court held:
Since standing is jurisdictional, it can be raised at any time, and the Court
has a duty to raise it sua sponte. Arambarri v. Armstrong, 152 Idaho 734,
738, 274 P.3d 1249, 1253 (2012) (citations omitted). (Emphasis added).
162 Idaho at 870.
C.

The Courts in the state ofldaho are required to give Full Faith and Credit to the
statutes of every State in the United States.

In Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 84 S.Ct. 242, 11 L.Ed.2d 186 (1963), the United
States Supreme Court held:
'Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress
may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.' U.S. Const. Art.
IV, s 1.
375 U.S. 107, footnote 1.

II.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE MAGISTRATE COURT'S FINDING THAT IT HAD
JURISDICTION OVER THE SALE OF THE SALT LAKE PROPERTY
The following facts are irrefutable:
The "Salt Lake Property" is located in the state of Utah. (R. pp. 546 547).
At the time of the parties' divorce, Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc., a
California Corporation, held a Warranty Deed to the Salt Lake Property. (R. pp. 546 547; 596).
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Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. was a California Corporation subject to
the laws of the state of California. (R. pp. 546 - 547).
At no time has either Ballard, Charlie or both ever held title (e.g. had a
deed in their name(s)) to the "Salt Lake Property."
At the time of trial, the "Salt Lake Property" was deeded to S & R Realty,
LLC, a Utah Limited Liability Company.
The "Salt Lake Property" is subject to the Utah Statute of Frauds set forth in Utah
Code§ 25-5-1 which provides:

25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property.
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real
property or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted,
assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of
law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating,
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful
agent thereunto authorized by writing.
Utah Code§ 25-5-1 is nearly identical to Idaho Code§ 9-503. Utah Code§ 78B-3-301
explicitly provides as follows:

78B-3-301. Actions involving real property.
(I) Actions for the following causes involving real property shall be tried
in the county in which they subject of the action, or some part, is situated:
(a) for the recovery ofreal property, or of an estate or interest in the
property:
(b) for the determination, in any form, of the right or interest in the
property:
(c) for injuries to real property;
(d) for the partition of real property; and
(e) for the foreclosure of all liens and mortgages on real property.
(2) If the real property is situated partly in one county and partly in
another, the plaintiff may select either of the counties, and the county
selected is the proper county for the trial of the action. (Emphasis added).

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - Page 4

A.

The district court erred as a matter of law when it affirmed the magistrate court's
determination that Ballard was the sole owner of the Salt Lake Property.

In the magistrate's Conclusions of Law, the magistrate court found as follows:
A. Jurisdiction.
Ballard argues this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter
Paragraph 2 of the 2007 Order and Paragraph 3 of the 2008 Order. At the
time of the parties' divorce in 2003, SMB was already dissolved and
Ballard had ownership of the SLC Property. After 1996, Ballard was the
sole shareholder of SMB stock. Ballard's actions of claiming of the rental
profits and expenses on his personal income tax returns are indicative that
the SLC Property was his sole property. (Emphasis added).
(R. p. 303). The district court, in affirming the magistrate court, ruled:

In contrast, there is substantial evidence in the record that the appellant
obtained title to the Salt Lake property at the dissolution of the
corporation. The appellant stated he was the sole shareholder of the
corporation and that all of the corporation's assets had been distributed to
the persons entitled to them. As the sole shareholder, there would be no
one else to distribute the assets to. See Zinn, 9 Cal.App.3d at 192.
The appellant acted like he was the sole owner of the property,
executing several deeds, selling part of it, and attempting to sell the
remainder. His actions and statements support the magistrate's
determination that he was the sole owner of the property, after the
1
dissolution of the corporation. (Emphasis added).
(R. p. 409). Neither the district court or the magistrate court had jurisdiction to determine

Ballard's, Charlie's, Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc.'s or any other entity's right or
interest in the Salt Lake Property. Only the state of Utah had jurisdiction to determine the
right or interest any person or legal entity had in the Salt Lake Property pursuant to Utah
Code§ 78B-3-301(1)(b).

1

By making this ruling to affirm the magistrate court's determination that the Salt Lake Property was
owned by Ballard at the time of divorce, the district court was ruling that the magistrate court had
jurisdiction to determine Ballard's interest in the Salt Lake Property at the time of the parties' divorce
despite the fact that Ballard did not hold a deed to the Salt Lake Property.
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As stated above, there is no question that title in the Salt Lake Property was held
by Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. at the time of Ballard and Charlie's divorce.
Charlie's attorney, Matt Bohn, represented to the Court on April 20, 2007 as follows:
What I will call the Salt Lake property is currently deeded to Sun
Mountain Broadcasting. It holds title to that property.

(R. p . 489, p . 3, L. 34 - p. 4, L. 1). Judge Day, based upon the fact that the Salt Lake
Property was titled in the name of Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc., ruled on the record at
the April 20, 2007 hearing that the magistrate court had no jurisdiction over the Salt Lake
Property as follows:
THE COURT: Just so the record is clear about technically, legally
what is going on here is they're - part of the final order, back in June of
2005, had to do with the division of the property that we have been
referring to, generally, as the Salt Lake Property.
In fact. the court may not have had jurisdiction to divide that property
because that property was owned by Sun Mountain Broadcasting, which
was a separate corporation. It was not owned individually by either party
2
or as community property.
But Sun Mountain Broadcasting had shares of stock, of course, that the
court would have had jurisdiction to divide and that stock was not arguably, it wasn't divided by that final order.
So what we are doing now is recognizing that, rather than dividing the
property, what this court has the power to do is address the stock in Sun
Mountain Broadcasting.
The parties, by their stipulation. have agreed that I can enter an order
that Ballard will assign all of that stock to B & C Realty, LLC; and then B

2

§ 2010 of the California Corporate Code provides in part:
(c) Any assets inadvertently or otherwise omitted from the winding up continue in the dissolved
corporation for the benefit of the persons entitled thereto upon dissolution of the corporation and
on realization shall be distributed accordingly.
The magistrate court did not have jurisdiction over Ballard as an officer or director of Sun Mountain
Broadcasting, Inc. and therefore, could not require Ballard to convey the Salt Lake Property from one legal
entity to another. Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 74 Ark.App. 372, 47 S.W.2d 920 (2001), Jayo Development,
Inc. v. Ada County Board of Equalization, 158 Idaho 148, 345 P.3d 207 (2015).
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& C Realty, LLC will be wound up to the extent possible and the assets
sold. (Emphasis added). 3
(R. p. 493, p. 20, L. 12 - p. 21, L. 9).
The district court in its ruling affirming the magistrate court discussed at length all
of the evidence in the record that it was Ballard who held title to the Salt Lake Property at
the time of the parties' divorce, despite the undisputed fact that title was held by Sun
Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. This was clearly error on the part of the district court as
neither the magistrate court or the district court had jurisdiction to determine title to real
property located in the state of Utah.
Idaho courts are required to give full faith and credit to the statutes of all other
states. Durfee v. Duke, 37 5 U.S. I 06, 84 S. Ct. 242, 11 L.Ed.2d 186 ( 1963), footnote 1.
Utah Code§ 78B-3-301 provides in part:

Judge Day made his ruling on the record that Ballard was stipulating to assigning his stock to B & C
Realty, LLC, that the magistrate court had no jurisdiction over the "Salt Lake Property," and that the Salt
Lake Property was owned by Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. and therefore, neither Ballard or Charlie
owned the Salt Lake Property as individuals or as community property immediately after Ballard's attorney
stated on the record as follows:
MR. PICA: And then we're dividing - we are dividing that asset, basically, by - I
mean, dividing the stock or dissolving the corporation - well, Ballard is agreeing to - and
deed it over. But, you know, any costs or obligations or anything that arises out of that - I
mean, it's a 50/50 deal going both ways. Okay.
THE COURT: That was my understanding of what the parties agreed.
MR. PICA: Yeah.
(R. p. 493, p. 20, LI. 2 - 11). Clearly, Judge Day understood Ballard's attorney was stating the agreement
was assign the stock to B & C Realty, LLC. Ballard's attorney did not mention the Salt Lake Property in his
statement. He only mentioned the stock and the corporation. For whatever reason, the district court, as well
as the magistrate court, chose to ignore Judge Day's understanding of the stipulated agreement when Judge
Day stated ... "Just so the record is clear ... ". Instead, the district court misconstrued the record of the
April 20, 2007 hearing in its Opinion on appeal that Ballard testified during the hearing, under oath, that he
understood the terms of the agreement that he was going to deed the Salt Lake Property to B & C Realty,
LLC. (R. p. 407). Neither Charlie's attorney, nor Ballard's attorney, objected to Judge Day's ruling on the
record that the parties were agreeing that Ballard would assign the Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. stock
to B & C Realty, LLC and immediately after Judge Day gave his ruling, both parties swore under oath that
they would abide by an order "based on the agreement discussed."
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78B-3-301. Actions involving real property.
(1) Actions for the following causes involving real property shall be tried
in the county in which they subject of the action, or some part, is situated:
(a) for the recovery of real property, or of an estate or interest in the
property;
(b) for the determination. in any form. of the right or interest in the
property; . . . (Emphasis added).
The magistrate court in Idaho did not have jurisdiction to determine that Ballard had title
to the Salt Lake Property.4 Only the state of Utah had jurisdiction to determine the
ownership of the Salt Lake Property. In Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455,680 P.2d 1355
(1984), the Idaho Supreme Court held:
[l]t is well settled that a judgment of a court of one state cannot directly
affect title to realty located in another state,
106 Idaho at 461. The magistrate court clearly directly affected title to the "Salt Lake
Property" at the time of divorce by concluding as follows:
At the time of the parties' divorce in 2003, SMB was already dissolved and
Ballard had ownership of the SLC Property.
(R. p. 303). This Conclusion of Law was made despite the irrefutable fact that Sun
Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. held the deed to the Salt Lake Property on the date of the
parties' divorce. Pursuant to Utah Code§ 25-5-1, "No estate or interest in real property
.. . shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise other than by
act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing ... ". The magistrate court
was required to give full faith and credit to Utah Code § 25-5-1 and recognize that Sun
Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. held the Warranty Deed for the Salt Lake Property on the
date of Ballard's and Charlie's divorce. The magistrate court failed to recognize the
4

The magistrate court, without jurisdiction, essentially quieted title to the Salt Lake Property in Ballard,
despite the fact that Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. clearly held title at the time of divorce.
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Warranty Deed and instead, without having jurisdiction over the Salt Lake Property,
proceeded to adjudicate Ballard's and Charlie's right or interest in the "Salt Lake
Property," despite Utah Code§ 78B-3-301(b) which required such an adjudication to
occur in the state of Utah, of which the magistrate court was required to give full faith
and credit pursuant to the United States Constitution. The district court erred in affirming
the magistrate court's ruling that Ballard was the owner of the Salt Lake Property at the
time of the parties' divorce, by also failing to give full faith and credit to Utah Code§ 255-1 and 78B-3-30l(b). Further, because Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. held the deed
to the "Salt Lake Property" at the time of the parties' divorce, the district court erred in
affirming the magistrate court's ruling that it had jurisdiction over the Salt Lake Property.
Therefore, the district court's ruling affirming the magistrate court's jurisdiction over the
Salt Lake Property should be reversed and Petitioner's Second Amended Petition to
Modify Order Pursuant to Rule 809 should be dismissed.
B.

The district court erred when it affirmed the magistrate court's ruling that the Salt
Lake Property was community property.
The district court affirmed the magistrate court's ruling that it had jurisdiction over

the Salt Lake Property because Ballard stipulated it was community property ruling as
follows:
The magistrate did not err in finding that the court had jurisdiction over
the sale of the Salt Lake property. The appellant stipulated that the Salt
Lake property was community property and that it would be sold and
"[u]pon sale, each party shall receive one-half of the net proceeds from the
sale." June 28, 2005 Final Order at 3.

(R. p. 405). Item number 5 of the Property and Debt Schedule attached to the Final Order
provided as follows:
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5

Property
Descriotion
Salt Lake City
Property

(R. p. 158).

Market
Value

Liens

Eouitv

-

C\S
C

To Husband

To Wife

X

X

Remarks
48 acres owned by BC
Realtv // Sell

5

At no time have the parties, either individually or jointly, ever held an interest in
real property in Salt Lake City. Utah Code § 25-5-1. Idaho Code § 32-906 provides in
part:

32-906. Community property - Income from separate and
community property- Conveyance between spouses. - (1) All other
property acquired after marriage by either husband or wife is community
property.
The parties never acquired real property in Salt Lake City, Utah, during their marriage.
Therefore, statutorily, the Salt Lake Property cannot be characterized as community
property (e.g. it also cannot be characterized as the separate property of either party as
neither party has ever held title to the real property, Utah Code§ 25-5-1). Idaho Code§
32-712 provides in part:

32-712. Community property and homestead - Disposition. - In
case of divorce by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction, the
community property and the homestead must be assigned as follows:
1. The community property must be assigned by the court in such
proportions as the court, from all the facts of the case and the condition of
the parties, deems just, with due consideration of the following factors:

5

The Property and Debt Schedule attached to the Final Order specifically provides the Salt Lake Property
is defined as 48 acres owned by B & C Realty. B & C Realty, LLC was a community owned Idaho Limited
Liability Company. B & C Realty, LLC never held title to any real property located in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Regardless, the magistrate court had no jurisdiction over the assets ofB & C Realty, LLC. (R. p. 491, p.
13, L. 25 - p. 14, L. 2).
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Divorce actions are statutorily driven and Idaho Code§ 32-712 only gives the magistrate
court jurisdiction to divide community property acquired during the marriage. In Pringle
v. Pringle, 109 Idaho 1026, 712 P .2d 727 (1985), the Idaho Court of Appeals held:
In contrast, we find that decisions from California are instructive. The
statutes of that state, like those of Idaho, authorize the division of
community property in a divorce but contain no reference to distributing
separate property. See Cal.Code Civil§ 4800. The California Supreme
Court long has held that divorce courts have "no jurisdiction" over
separate property. Reid v. Reid, 112 Cal. 274, 44 Pac. 564 (1896). That
view is still echoed by California appellate courts today. E.g., Buford v.
Buford, 202 Cal.Rptr. 20, 155 Cal.App.3d 74 (1984); Porter v. Superior
Court, 141 Cal.Rptr. 59, 73 Cal.App.3d 793 (1977).
We conclude that the magistrate in this case exceeded his authority by
attempting to compel a transfer of separate property from the wife to the
husband.
109 Idaho at 1028 - 1029. Given the fact that the magistrate court has no jurisdiction to
compel a spouse to transfer their separate property, it is beyond reason that a magistrate
court would have the jurisdiction to compel a third party entity that is not a party to the
action to transfer or sell their property (real or personal).
Judge Day recognized that the magistrate court had no jurisdiction over the Salt
Lake Property at the hearing on April 20, 2007 when he ruled on the record as follows:
Frankly, it is not something I think this court has jurisdiction over.
This court has jurisdiction over, presently, the stock of -- what is it -- Sun
Mountain-MR. PICA: Sun Mountain Broadcasting.
MR. BOHN: Sun Mountain Broadcasting.
THE COURT: Sun Mountain Broadcasting, that's what we have
jurisdiction over, and not over the acts of B & C Realty, LLC.
MR. PICA: Right. (Emphasis added).
(R. p. 491 , p. 13, L. 19 - p. 14, L. 3). Judge Day then made a clear ruling on the record as
to what Ballard and Charlie were stipulating to stating as follows:
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THE COURT: I believe I understand the terms of the parties'
agreement. I have made notes of my understanding.
Madam Clerk, of course, has kept her minutes.
Is there anything else, counsel, that either one of you need to place on
the record at this time:
MR. PICA: One last thing, just as a point of clarification. Now, Sun
Mountain Broadcasting - we are treating that as an omitted asset. Okay?
THE COURT: Yes, I did want to clarify that, and I appreciate that.
MR. PICA: Okay.
THE COURT: My understanding is what we're doing is MR. PICA: And then we're dividing - we are dividing that asset,
basically, by - I mean, dividing the stock or dissolving the corporation well, Ballard is agreeing to - and deed it over. But, you know, any costs or
obligations or anything that arises out of that - I mean, it's a 50/50 deal
going both ways. Okay.
THE COURT: That was my understanding of what the parties agreed.
MR. PICA: Yeah.
THE COURT: Just so the record is clear about technically, legally
what is going on here is they're - part of the final order, back in June of
2005, had to do with the division of the property that we have been
referring to, generally, as the Salt Lake property.
In fact. the court may not have had jurisdiction to divide that property
because that property was owned by Sun Mountain Broadcasting. which
was a separate corporation. It was not owned individually by either party
or as community property.
But Sun Mountain Broadcasting had shares of stock, of course, that the
court would have had jurisdiction to divide and that stock was not arguably, it wasn't divided by that final order.
So what we are doing now is recognizing that, rather than dividing the
property, what this court has the power to do is address the stock in Sun
Mountain Broadcasting.
The parties, by their stipulation, have agreed that I can enter an order
that Ballard will assign all of that stock to B & C Realty, LLC; and then B
& C Realty, LLC will be wound up to the extent possible and the assets
sold. (Emphasis added).
(R. p. 493, p. 19, L. 13 - p. 21, L. 9). At no time did Ballard stipulate to deed the Salt
Lake Property to B & C Realty, LLC.
Despite Judge Day's ruling that the magistrate court did not have jurisdiction over
the Salt Lake Property, and the irrefutable evidence that Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc.
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held the deed to the Salt Lake Property at the time of the parties' divorce, the district court
erroneously ruled that the Salt Lake Property was community property because Ballard
stipulated that the Salt Lake Property was community property in the June 28, 2005 Final
Order. (R. p. 405). The district court's ruling creates two (2) distinct problems. First, in
order for the magistrate court to obtain jurisdiction over the Salt Lake Property, the
parties would have had to held title to the Salt Lake Property at the time of divorce. They
clearly did not hold title. Even if the district court were correct that Ballard stipulated the
Salt Lake Property was community property at the time of the June 28, 2005 Final Order,
the stipulation would not have given the magistrate court jurisdiction over the Salt Lake
Property when jurisdiction did not exist. 6 In Kantor v. Kantor, 106 Idaho 803, 379 P.3d
1073 (2016), the Idaho Supreme Court held:
Further, "parties to an action cannot confer or create subject matter
jurisdiction upon or in a court if in fact it does not exist." Fairway Dev.
Co. v. Bannock Cnty., 119 Idaho 121,125, 804 P.2d 294,298 (1990).
"[S]ubject matter jurisdiction can never be waived or consented to" and
"judgments and orders made without subject matter jurisdiction are void."
State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837,840,262 P.3d 1255, 1258 (2011). (Emphasis
added).
160 Idaho at 808. Since Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. clearly held title to the Salt
Lake Property on June 28, 2005, there was no possible avenue by which the Salt Lake
Property could be deemed "community property" so that the magistrate court would have
had jurisdiction over the Salt Lake Property. Judge Day recognized this when he made
his ruling on the record on April 20, 2007 that Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. owned

6

It should be noted that Item 5 on the Property and Debt Schedule identified the Salt Lake Property as
property owned by B & C Realty. No such property existed as B & C Realty did not own any property in
Salt Lake City.
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the Salt Lake Property, which both the district court and the magistrate court have

.
d1
ignore
.
Second, if in fact the Final Order entered on June 28, 2005 adjudicated the
disposition of the Salt Lake Property, the magistrate court would not have had the
jurisdiction to enter an Order based upon the stipulation placed on the record on April 20,
2007. In Kantor v. Kantor, 160 Idaho 803, 379 P.3d 1073 (2016), the Idaho Supreme
Court held:
"This Court has long recognized that a court's jurisdiction to amend or
set aside the judgment in a case does not continue forever." State v.
Hartwig, 150 Idaho 326,329,246 P.3d 979, 982 (2011) (quoting State v.
Jakosld, 139 Idaho 352,354, 79 P.3d 711, 713 (2003)). "In the absence of
a statute or rule extending its jurisdiction, a trial court loses subject matter
jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment once the judgment has
become final, either by expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of
the judgment on appeal." Id at 330 n. 3, 246 P.3d at 983 n. 3. Further,
7

The district court also erred when it ruled . .. "dissolved corporations have no legal existence." (R. p.
408). The caselaw cited by the district court (e.g. Kilgore v. Rancho Carlsbad Partners, 2004 WL 1551489
(Cal.Ct.App.) specifically provides that after a certificate of dissolution is filed, corporate existence
continues to exist for purposes of winding up. (R. p. 408), To get around this flaw in the district court's
ruling, the district court states:
There is nothing in the record showing or indicating that SMB had any further "winding up" and
that this would take another eleven years to accomplish. Rather, the reasonable inference is that
the Salt Lake property was one of the assets of the dissolved corporation that was distributed and
that it was distributed to the appellant as its sole shareholder, as his actions and statements would
indicate.
(R. p. 408, footnote 5). This "inference" is clearly in error as it is irrefutable as Sun Mountain
Broadcasting, Inc. held title to the "Salt Lake Property" on April 20, 2007, several years after the parties'
divorce was final. In Catalina Investments, Inc. v. Jones, 98 Cal.App.4th I, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 256 (2002),
the Court of Appeals for the California Second District ruled as follows:
Further, section 20 I 0, relating to the powers of a dissolved corporation, provides in relevant part:
"(a) A corporation which is dissolved nevertheless continues to exist for the purpose of winding up
its affairs, prosecuting and defending actions by or against it and enabling it to collect and
discharge obligations, dispose of and convey its property and collect and divide its assets, but not
for the purpose ofcontinuing business except so far as necessary for the winding up thereof
(Emphasis added).
( 119 Cal.Rptr. at 260-261 ). The district court was required to give full faith and credit to California
caselaw and statutes because Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. was a California Corporation subject to the
laws of California. Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. had further "winding up" as it still held the deed to the
"Salt Lake Property." Further, as set forth above, the courts in the state of Idaho did not have jurisdiction
over the determination of who held title to the Salt Lake Property. (Utah Code § 788-3-301) (Cal. Corp.
Code§ 2010(c)).
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"parties to an action cannot confer or create subject matter jurisdiction
upon or in a court if in fact it does not exist." Fairway Dev. Co. v.
Bannock Cnty., 119 Idaho 121 , 125, 804 P.2d 294, 298 (1990). "[S]ubject
matter jurisdiction can never be waived or consented to" and "judgments
and orders made without subject matter jurisdiction are void." State v.
Lute, 150 Idaho 837,840,252 P.3d 1255, 1258 (2011).
160 Idaho at 807 - 808. Paragraph 2 of the Order Dismissing Contempts and Modifying
Order Re: April 20, 2007 Hearing filed October 23, 20088 would also be void (R. pp. 600
- 603) thereby making Charlie's Second Amended Petition to Modify Order Pursuant to
Rule 809 moot. Therefore, the district court's ruling affirming the magistrate court's
ruling should be reversed and the magistrate court's Judgment should be vacated. The
parties never held a community interest in real property in Salt Lake City over which the
magistrate court could have acquired jurisdiction.
C.

The magistrate court had no jurisdiction to enter the Order Re: April 20, 2007
Hearing as it pertains to the Salt Lake Property.
Judge Day made it very clear that he had no jurisdiction over the Salt Lake

Property and that the Salt Lake Property was not community property. (R. p. 493, p. 20,
L. 12 - p. 21, L. 9). He also made it clear that Ballard and Charlie were stipulating that

Ballard would assign the stock he held in Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. Based upon
that stipulation, Ballard, as well as Charlie, testified under oath that they would abide by
that stipulation. Charlie's testimony was as follows:
THE COURT: If! sign the order, based on the agreement discussed on
the record, are you willing to abide by that order, ma'am?
MS. CHARLIE SMITH: I am.

8

Ballard knows of no statute or rule that conferred on the magistrate court the jurisdiction to enter
paragraph 2 of the Order Dismissing Contempts and Modifying Order Re: April 20, 2007 Hearing since it
was filed almost three (3) years after the Final Order and almost a year and a half after the Order Re: April
20, 2007 Hearing was filed.
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(R. p. 494, p. 24, LL 21 - 24). Ballard testified as follows:
THE COURT: lfl sign the order that has the terms that we - that you
have agreed to here today, are you willing to abide by that order, sir?
MR. BALLARD SMITH: I am, Your Honor.

(R. p. 494, p. 25, LL 16 - 19). The district court did not recognize Judge Day's ruling on
the record at the April 20, 2007 hearing wherein he stated:
So what we are doing now is recognizing that, rather than dividing the
property, what this court has the power to do is address the stock in Sun
Mountain Broadcasting.
The parties, by their stipulation, have agreed that I can enter an order
that Ballard will assign all of that stock to B & C Realty, LLC; and then B
& C Realty, LLC, will be wound up to the extent possible and the assets
sold. (Emphasis added).

(R. p. 493, p. 21, LL 1 - 9). The district court ignored Judge Day's clear statement of what
the parties were agreeing to and instead, badly misstated the record, as did the magistrate
court.
The magistrate court had no jurisdiction to enter the Order Re: April 20, 2007
Hearing9 filed May 14, 2007 as drafted because the court had no jurisdiction over the Salt
Lake Property, regardless of the fact that Ballard's attorney approved the Order Re: April
20, 2007 Hearing as to form and content, because, as Judge Day ruled, the Salt Lake
Property was owned by Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. and therefore, was not

9

It is important to note that the Order Re: April 20, 2007 Hearing stated that it was .. . "based upon the
Stipulation of the parties placed on the record," which is not accurate. Further, it orders in paragraph 2 that
the parties "stipulate and agree." Paragraph 2 does not order Ballard and/or Charlie to take any other
action. Contrast paragraph 2 to paragraphs I, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, IO, l l, 12, 13 14 and 15 which specifically
direct the parties to take certain action and are accurate in regard to the stipulation placed on the record on
April 20, 2007. Paragraph 2 as written is unenforceable. (R. pp. 216 - 2 I 7). Ironically, the magistrate
court concluded as a matter of law that the parties expressly stipulated in 2007 to divide the community
portion of the Sun Mountain Broadcasting stock. (R. p. 304)
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community property. (R. p. 493, p. 20, LL 20 - 21). Judge Day's ruling is consistent with
Idaho Code§§ 32-906(1) and 32-712 as well as Pringle v. Pringle, 109 Idaho 1026, 71 2
P.2d 727 (App. 1985). In divorce actions, Idaho Courts do not have jurisdiction over
property that is not community.
D.

The magistrate court had no jurisdiction to consider Charlie's Second Amended
Petition to Modify Order Pursuant to Rule 809 because Charlie had no standing.
Charlie has no interest in the Salt Lake Property as she has never held title to the

Salt Lake Property. Utah Code § 25-5-1 . Title to the Salt Lake Property has always been
held by a third party legal entity (e.g. Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. at the time of the
parties' divorce and S & R Realty, LLC at the time of trial). In the district court's Opinion
on Appeal, the district court states:
To the extent that the appellant asserts B&C Realty and S&R Realty are
not parties to this action and that their absence deprived the Court of
jurisdiction, failure to join an indispensable party is an affirmative defense
that is required to be raised either by motion or in a responsive pleading,
which the appellant failed to do.
(R. p. 415). The district court did not recognize the jurisdictional issue which is Charlie's
standing to bring a claim that if viable, belonged to a third party.
In Shepherd v. Shepherd, 161 Idaho 14,383 P.3d 693 (2016), the Idaho Supreme
Court held:
"Jurisdictional issues, like standing, are questions of law, over which
this Court exercises free review." In re Jerome Cnty. Bd. ofComm'rs, 153
Idaho 298, 308, 281 P.3d 1076, 1086 (2012). "[Q]uestions of jurisdiction
... must be addressed prior to reaching the merits of an appeal." Taylor v.
Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709, 201 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2009). "The issue of
whether a party has standing to assert a particular claim should be resolved
before the merits of the claim are reached." State v. Doe, 148 Idaho 919,
936, 231 P.3d 1016, 1033 (2010).
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161 Idaho at 19. In State v. Doe, 148 Idaho 919,231 P.3d 1016 (2010), the Idaho
Supreme Court held:
Courts must hesitate before resolving the rights of those not parties to
litigation. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 2873-74,
49 L.Ed.2d 826, 832-33 (1976). Even though a potentially illegal action
may affect the litigant as well as a third party, the litigant may not rest his
claims on the rights or legal interests of the third party. Dep 't ofLabor v.
Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720, 1 IO S.Ct. 1428, 1431 -32, 108 L.Ed.2d 701,
713 (1990).
*

*

*

As a result, the U .S. Supreme Court requires a litigant who seeks to
assert the rights of another party to demonstrate three interrelated criteria:
(I) he must have suffered injury in fact, providing a significantly concrete
interest in the outcome of the matter in dispute; (2) he must have a
sufficiently close relationship to the party whose rights he is asserting; and
(3) there must be a demonstrated bar to the third parties' ability to protect
their interests. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 137071, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 , 425-26 (1991). (Emphasis added).
148 Idaho at 936. Charlie's claims in her Second Amended Petition to Modify Order
Pursuant to Rule 809 are based upon her having an interest in the Salt Lake Property.
Neither Charlie or Ballard had an interest in the Salt Lake Property as it was owned by a
third party entity at the time of their divorce on April 14, 2003. Therefore, Charlie was
seeking to assert the alleged rights of a third party (e.g. Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc.
and/or B & C Realty, LLC). There is no evidence in the record that those third party
entities did not have the ability to protect their own interests as to the Salt Lake Property.
The district court erred when it didn't recognize that the magistrate court did not have
jurisdiction because Charlie did not have standing. Therefore, the district court's decision
should be reversed and Charlie's Second Amended Petition to Modify Order Pursuant to
Rule 809 should be dismissed.
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III.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED
THE MAGISTRATE COURT'S RULING THAT BALLARD WAS JUDICIALLY
ESTOPPED FROM CHALLENGING THE 2007 AND 2008 ORDERS
The district court ruled as follows:
As the magistrate concluded, the appellant is judicially estopped from
now arguing that the Salt Lake property was not community property and
in arguing that he had no ability to deed it over so that it could be sold and
the proceeds divided equally between the respondent and him, which is
what he said he could and would do.
(R. p. 410). In Fix v. Fix, 125 Idaho 372, 870 P.2d 1331 (1993), the Idaho Supreme
Court held:
In limited circumstances, a property division may be modified contrary
to the bar ofresjudicata using I.R.C.P. 60(b). See Harper v. Harper, 122
Idaho 535, 537, 835 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Ct.App. 1992). See also Allen v.
Allen, 645 P.2d 774, 776 (Alaska 1982); In re Marriage ofParks, 48
Wash.App. 166, 737 P.2d 1316, 1319 (1987) (stating that a motion under
rule 60(b) is "ancillary to or a continuation of the original suit" and so long
as the Court had jurisdiction originally, jurisdiction continues for purposes
of rule 60(b)): Harshfieldv. Harshfield, 842 P.2d 535,538 (Wyo. 1992).
(Emphasis added).

125 Idaho at 376. I.R.F.L.P. 809 is identical to I.R.C.P. 60(b). Pursuant to Fix v. Fix,
125 Idaho 372, 870 P.2d 1331 (1993), the magistrate court was required to determine
whether it had jurisdiction to enter the 2007 and 2008 Orders and should have recognized
Judge Day's ruling on April 20, 2007.
It is black letter law that judicial estoppel does not apply to subject matter
jurisdiction. In Fairway Development Co. v. Bannock County, 119 Idaho 121 , 804 P.2d
294 (1990), the Idaho Supreme Court held:
In White v. Marty, 97 Idaho 85, 540 P.2d 270 (1975) (overruled on
other grounds, Carr v. Magistrate Court ofFirst Jud Dist.., 108 Idaho
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546, 700 P.2d 949 (1985)), this Court held that parties to an action cannot
confer or create subject matter jurisdiction upon or in a court if in fact it
does not exist. This Court explained:
While it is clear that personal jurisdiction may be gained by
a court through consent of the parties, neither estoppel nor
consent will confer subject matter jurisdiction on a judge to
try a case which by statute and court rule is clearly in
excess of his authority to adjudicate.
The defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is never
waived and must be asserted by the Court if it finds that it lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter. Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata,
99 Idaho 624,586 P.2d 1068 (1978). (Emphasis added).
119 Idaho at 126. In Kantor v. Kantor, 106 Idaho 803,379 P.3d 1073 (2016), the Idaho
Supreme Court held:
Further, "parties to an action cannot confer or create subject matter
jurisdiction upon or in a court if in fact it does not exist." Fairway Dev.
Co. v. Bannock Cnty., 119 Idaho 121, 125, 804 P.2d 294,298 (1990).
"[S]ubject matter jurisdiction can never be waived or consented to" and
"judgments and orders made without subject matter jurisdiction are void."
State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837,840,262 P.3d 1255, 1258 (2011). (Emphasis
added).
160 Idaho at 808. The Idaho Supreme Court in Kantor further held:
Sondra has raised several arguments that we must also address. First,
Sondra argues Robert should be judicially estopped from challenging the
merger because Robert took the position that the magistrate court should
merge the PSA into the judgment of divorce. It is true that Robert did take
contradictory positions at times. However, this Court has held "neither
estoppel nor consent will confer subject matter jurisdiction on a judge to
try a case which by statute and court rule is clearly in excess of his
authority to adjudicate." Fairway Dev. Co., 119 Idaho at 125-26, 804 P.2d
at 298-99 (quoting White v. Marty, 97 Idaho 85, 89, 540 P.2d 270, 274
(1975)). (Emphasis added).
160 Idaho at 808. Regardless of whether Ballard has taken an inconsistent position,
which he has not, the magistrate court has no jurisdiction over the Salt Lake Property as it
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was owned by a third party at the time of divorce. 10 Judge Day ruled that the Salt Lake
Property was not community property as it was owned by Sun Mountain Broadcasting,
Inc. Idaho Code § 32-712 only gives the magistrate court jurisdiction over the parties'
community property. Clearly the district court erred when it ruled that the magistrate
court was correct when it ruled Ballard was judicially estopped from arguing that the Salt
Lake Property was community property. Therefore, the district court's ruling should be
reversed and Charlie's Second Amended Petition to Modify Order Pursuant to Rule 809
should be dismissed.
IV.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE MAGISTRATE
COURT'S APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER TO SELL THE
SALT LAKE PROPERTY
In her Second Amended Petition to Modify Order Pursuant to Rule 809 filed on
January 25, 2017, filed about three and a half years after filing her initial Petition to
Modify Order Pursuant to Rule 809, Charlie plead in part as follows:
COMES NOW the Petitioner Charlie Smith ("Charlie") by and through
her attorney of record Stanley W. Welsh of the firm Cosho Humphrey,
LLP and hereby moves this Court under Rule 809 of the Idaho Rules of
Family Law Procedure for an order setting aside and/or modifying the
Order Dismissing Contempts and Modifying Order Re: April 20, 2007
Hearing that was entered on October 23, 2008 with regard to the Salt Lake
Property. Charlie is requesting that the court eliminate the terms
contained in paragraph 3 . . .
*

°

1

*

*

Charlie was well aware of the fact that Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. held the deed to the Salt Lake
Property at the time of the parties' divorce based upon her attorney's representation to the court and
therefore, the Salt Lake Property was beyond the jurisdiction of the magistrate court. She is therefore
estopped from arguing the Salt Lake Property is community property and the court has jurisdiction.
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In the alternative, Charlie requests that a mutually agreeable receiver be
appointed to handle the approximately forty-eight unsold acres that remain
and that the net proceeds be divided equally. (Emphasis added).
(R. pp. 280 - 282). From this one (1) sentence the magistrate court entered a Judgment
Re: IRFLP 809(5) on March 23, 2018 which provided in part:
3. JUDGMENT ON INCOME AND EXPENSES: Charlie is
awarded one-half of the net rental income, and any other consideration and
amounts received by Ballard in connection with the Salt Lake City
Property, from January 1, 2007 to the present, less her one-half of the
legitimate costs and taxes as provided in the prior court orders. The
Receiver appointed by separate court order shall provide the accounting
for the rental income, costs, taxes and any other relevant financial matters.
Ballard shall be solely responsible to pay all penalties and interest owed on
all delinquent taxes.
4. MODIFIED ORDERS: The Order Dismissing Contempts and
Modifying Order Re: April 20, 2007 Hearing entered on October 23, 2008
("2008 Order") is hereby modified. Paragraph 3 of the 2008 Order shall
place the Receiver as the sole person in charge of handling all matters
pertaining to the management, operation, marketing, sale and leasing of
the Salt Lake Property and B & C Realty LLC and remove Ballard as the
person appointed. Ballard shall immediately transfer title by executing a
deed transferring the Salt Lake Property into the name of B&C Realty,
LLC. Ballard shall have no authority or right to handle any matter relating
to the Property or B&C Realty, LLC. Charlie shall reinstate B&C Realty,
LLC (an Idaho limited liability company) and identify only Ballard and
Charlie as the members. In the event, Charlie is unable to because of
Ballard's prior conduct, Charlie shall immediately notify Ballard through
counsel and Ballard shall reinstate B&C Realty, LLC and identify only
Charlie and Ballard as the members.
5. Further, the prior court orders are modified with respect to any
terms inconsistent with this Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law entered on January 29, 2018 and the order appointing the receiver
addressed below.
6. RECEIVER: A Receiver shall be appointed pursuant to Idaho
Code Section 8-601 to handle all matters relating to the Salt Lake
Property, located at 1540 W. 2300 N., Salt Lake City, Utah, 84116, legally
described in Exhibit A. The Receiver shall exclusively handle the
management, operation, marketing, sale, leasing, payment of costs,
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finances, accounting, and distribution of the net proceeds of the Salt Lake
Property and provide an accounting to the Court with respect to the lease
proceeds, any other proceeds or consideration, payment of costs authorized
by the 2007 Order and the 2008 Order, and determine what amount(s)
were paid for penalties and interest on taxes for the Salt Lake Property and
handle all other accounting, financial and other matters relating to the
Property and B&C Realty pursuant to the Order Appointing Receiver.

(R. pp. 316- 318). On March 23, 2018, the magistrate court entered an Order Re:
Receiver Duties. The Order Re: Receiver Duties far exceeded the portion of the
Judgment Re: I.R.F.L.P. 809(5) relating to the appointment of a receiver and the receiver
duties. This even included giving the receiver the authority to sign a deed conveying the
Salt Lake Property from S & R Realty, LLC to B & C Realty, LLC (R. p. 584), a defunct
Idaho limited liability company that could not be reinstated so a new limited liability
company with the same name was formed by Charlie pursuant to the Judgment Re:
I.R.F.L.P. 809(5). (See Appendix "A"). While Ballard objected to provisions regarding
the appointment of a receiver, both in the Judgment Re: I.R.F.L.P. 809(5) and the Order
Re: Receiver Duties, arguing that none of the relief set forth regarding a receiver had been
plead, those objections were ignored. (R. pp. 539 - 541 ; pp. 548 - 550). 11
A.

The magistrate court had no jurisdiction to appoint a receiver.
As argued above, the magistrate court had no jurisdiction to appoint a receiver to

"handle" the Salt Lake Property as it was owned by a third party. Further, in order for a
court to obtain jurisdiction to appoint a receiver in Idaho, the requesting party has to plead

11

It is notable that the Order Re: Receiver Duties gave the magistrate court jurisdiction over B & C
Realty, LLC until the sale of the Salt Lake Property was completed. (R. p. 590). Only the district court had
jurisdiction over the winding up of an Idaho limited liability company pursuant to Idaho Code § 30-25702( e).
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certain facts. In Cronan v. District Court of Kootenai County. 15 Idaho 184, 96 P. 768
( 1908), the Idaho Supreme Court held:
[T]he application for the receiver fails to set forth any facts showing that it
is in imminent danger of insolvency, as was said in State v. Ross, 122 Mo.
435, 25 S.W. 947, 23 LR.A. 534. The petition in that case did not state
facts sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to appoint a receiver, and the
facts in this case, as set forth in the petition, laid no foundation whatever
for the exercise of the jurisdiction of the judge to appoint a receiver on the
ground that the Lumber Company was in imminent danger of insolvency,
for no allegation showing those facts are set forth therein. The courts in
this state, in order to obtain jurisdiction for the appointment of a receiver
on the grounds of imminent danger of insolvency, must have facts
sufficient presented to show such danger before it has power to exercise
the jurisdiction of appointment. (Emphasis added).
96 P. at 776. In Huggima v. Green Top Dairy Farms, 75 Idaho 436, 273 P.2d 399 (1954),
the Idaho Supreme Court held:
The facts upon which the application for receiver is founded must be
alleged. Mere legal conclusions will not be sufficient. It is necessary to
allege facts which show the necessity and propriety for the appointment,
and that the property or fund in question is in danger of being lost,
removed or materially injured. 53 C.J. 54, Sec. 44; 75 C.J.S., Receivers, §
43, p. 702; Cronan v. District Court, 15 Idaho 184, 96 P. 768. (Emphasis
added).
75 Idaho at 445. Charlie failed to plead any facts that conferred jurisdiction on the
magistrate court to appoint a receiver to sell the Salt Lake Property.
B.

The district court erred when it affirmed the magistrate court's decision to
appoint a receiver on the grounds that every court has the authority to enforce
obedience of its judgments.
Assuming for the sake of argument only that the magistrate court had jurisdiction

to enter the Order Dismissing Contempts and Modifying Order Re: April 20, 2007
Hearing filed April 23, 2008, the prospective application of that Order was to sell the Salt
Lake Property, not the procedure by which it was sold. To modify a judgment pursuant to
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I.R.F.L.P. 809(5) (e.g. I.R.C.P. 60(b)(5)), the moving party must establish a change of
circumstances to justify the modification.
In Gordon v. Gordon, 118 Idaho 804, 800 P.2d 1018 (1990) the Idaho Supreme
Court held:
A motion pursuant to the "no longer equitable" language of Rule
60(b)(5) however, implies some change in circumstances.
The rule allows relief if it is "no longer equitable" for the
judgment to have prospective application. This provision is not a
substitute for an appeal. It does not allow relitigation of issues
that have been resolved by the judgment. Instead it refers to
some change in conditions that makes continued enforcement
inequitable.
11 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2863, pp.
206-07 (1973).
Therefore, we are of the opinion and hold that the condition for relief
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) is similar to the requirements ofl.C. § 32-709,
i.e., some change in the circumstances of the parties is necessary to make
the prospective application of the judgment inequitable.
118 Idaho at 806 - 807. Charlie failed to plead and establish that there had been any
change in circumstances that made it unequitable to enforce the 2008 Order. Further,
Charlie never requested that the 2008 Order no longer have prospective application. She
wanted the Salt Lake Property sold and the proceeds divided. The magistrate court failed
to find any change of circumstances that would support a modification of the 2008 Order.
The magistrate court justified the appointment of a receiver by making the following
conclusion of law:
In this case, Charlie is a creditor to whom funds are owed. The
appointment of a receiver is necessary to effectuate the 2007 Order and the
2008 Order. A legitimate sale of the remaining 48 acres is long overdue.
This is also the only way that Charlie will ever receive a true accounting of
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what happened to the lease proceeds and to assure that she receives her
one-half of the net proceeds of the sale of the six acres. 12
The appointment of a receiver is the only way the court can see that it
will be provided with an accurate accounting of the lease proceeds and the
legitimate costs incurred by Ballard that may be deducted. 13 The court
cannot trust Ballard to provide Charlie with her fair share of this asset. 14
Moreover, it is the only way to assure that the remaining 48 acres are sold
for fair market value. 15
(R. pp. 307 - 308).
Receivers are rarely appointed. In fact, there is very little caselaw in the state of
Idaho as receivers are rarely appointed. In Kelly v. Steele, 9 Idaho 141 (1903), the Idaho
Supreme Court held:
Appointments of receivers to take charge of real property should never
be made until the moving party shows himself clearly entitled thereto. It is
not the policy of courts of equity to take charge of real estate and manage
and control it through the aid of a receiver as against the party in
possession asserting title in himself, unless it is shown to be in imminent
danger of great waste or irreparable injury. Even in such cases it seems to
be the general rule that the courts will require a strong showing as to the
likelihood of the plaintiff eventually establishing his right to recover. The
realty, the substance of the litigation, is not capable of destruction or

12

The magistrate court entered a Judgment against Ballard for one-half of the net proceeds. A receiver
cannot assist with that Judgment.
13
The 2008 Order set forth the method by which Charlie could object to expenses, listing agreement, etc.
by filing a motion with the court. Charlie never invoked this provision of the Order and therefore waived
objections despite admitting she received the listing agreement, etc. (R. pp. 552 - 573). The magistrate
court by its ruling retroactively modified the 2008 Order.
14
The magistrate court's "mistrust" of Ballard is based on innuendos. The magistrate court found . . .
"[T]he events surrounding this purchase contract raise a number of concerning red flags as to whether
Ballard had a side deal. .. . " (R. p. 302), This finding was made despite the fact that Charlie testified that
she had no evidence of any side deals Ballard was involved in. (T. p. 377, LI. 9 - 14; p. 378, LI. 7 - 10; p.
378, L. 21 - p. 379, L. 4; p. 280, LI. 11 - 15).
15
The magistrate court made the following finding:
Larry Rigby's appraisal reflects a value of $900,000. It is troublesome because it depends upon the
preliminary study conducted by Frontier Corporation in 2012." (R. p. 30).
Charlie hired Larry Rigby without Ballard's knowledge to make the appraisal. Larry Rigby was her expert
for whom Charlie was awarded expert witness fees. She then "impeached" her own expert with Larry
Jorgenson's appraisal a couple of years later. Ballard accepted the Rigby appraisal as a valid basis for the
market value of the Salt Lake Property when listing the property.
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removal, and hence the necessity for a receiver can seldom be so urgent as
in other cases. (Emphasis added).

72 P. at 888. The basis upon which the magistrate appointed a receiver does not pass
muster. Charlie is not a creditor of Ballard as the court found. If Charlie were a creditor,
she would be a creditor of a third party legal entity.
The district court affirmed the magistrate court's appointment of a receiver citing
Rudd v. Rudd, 105 Idaho 112,666 P.2d 639 (1983). However, Rudd v. Rudd does not
support the appointment of a receiver in this action. In Rudd v. Rudd, the Idaho Supreme
Court affirmed that the magistrate court had jurisdiction to modify a property settlement
set forth in the original Decree of Divorce five (5) years after the Decree of Divorce was
entered pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(5) after finding that the parties could no longer comply
with the original decree. Rudd v. Rudd, 105 Idaho 112, 118,666 P.2d 639,645 (1983).
The Idaho Supreme Court held:
Under Rule 60(b)(5) a movant must also show a sufficient change of
circumstances rendering enforcement of the judgment inequitable. Such a
showing was made in the present case. The original decree ordered all of
the property owned by the parties to be sold and the proceeds divided.
However. the record reflects that by the time the motion for a final
division of property was made much of the personal property had either
disappeared or become worthless. Thus, it was no longer equitable that
the 1975 decree continue in force to affect property that may or may not
have existed in 1978, .. . (Emphasis added).
105 Idaho at 646. In other words, if a judgment can be enforced as written, the court has
no jurisdiction to modify it as the judgment is res judicata. In this action, the district
court erred in its affirmation of the application of I.R.F.L.P. 809.5 by the magistrate court
when it ruled as follows:
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The respondent also noted before the magistrate under the prior orders, she
"has no approval rights over the terms of any sale even though she is
greatly affected by such terms." Post Trial Brief at 23. She "has
absolutely no say in the purchase price of the property, except as provided
for by the listing agreement requirements, so Ballard is free to structure
any deal he wants to even if it is completely self-serving to the exclusion
of Charlie's interest." Id, at 3 7.
(R. p. 368). The fact that Charlie did not like the language in the 2008 Order is not a
basis for a modification pursuant to I.R.F.L.P. 809.5. Such a basis renders the doctrine of
res judicata meaningless.
The district court's affirmation of the magistrate court's decision to appoint a
receiver should be reversed and Charlie's Second Amended Petition to Modify Order
Pursuant to Rule 809 should be dismissed.
V.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
$112,125.00 JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST BALLARD
Assuming for the sake of argument that Charlie does have an interest in the Salt
Lake Property, despite never holding a deed, Charlie never paid any portion of the
property taxes owed against the Salt Lake Property, despite the fact that the rental income
from the Salt Lake Property was not sufficient enough to cover the property taxes that
accrued on the Salt Lake Property from the date of the parties' divorce on April 14, 2003
through 2012. (T. p. 372, LL 9 - 20, Respondent's Exhibit KK, p. 32, L. 16 - p. 33, L. 13;
p. 35, L. 23 - p. 37, L. 4). This was a violation of the Order entered on April 14, 2003 as
well as all subsequent Orders. The magistrate court made the following finding of fact in
support of the $112,125.00 Judgment:
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In March, 2013, Ballard transferred a portion of the property
(approximately 6 acres) to BZW Investments. This sale was completed
with the issuance of title insurance. Ballard retained all the proceeds from
this sale. The sale was a result of a Listing Agreement with Mr. Davis.
The transferred property, which was contaminated, sold for $224,250.00.
Out of the proceeds, Ballard used $106,923.23 for property taxes on the 48
acres for tax years 2008 through 2012. Ballard used the proceeds for this
purpose despite the fact he had received income from the rental of the
property from 2008 through 2012. The tax bills for those years included
penalties and interest due to Ballard's late payment.

(R. p. 300). Petitioner's exhibit 203 documents the property taxes that were paid from the
$106,923.23 plus penalties and interest through December 12, 2012. The total property
tax charges due for years 2008 through 2012 excluding penalties and interest for the Salt
Lake Property was $90,760.97 (e.g. the penalties and interest totaled an additional
$16,162.26). The magistrate court was correct that S & R Realty received the rental
income for the Salt Lake Property from 2008 through 2012. However, that rental income
totaled $57,915.00. (Petitioner's exhibits 225 and 241 ). That left a shortfall of
$32,845.97. Further, Charlie admitted that she failed to pay any property taxes for the
Salt Lake Property from the date of divorce in 2003. The property taxes were current
through tax year 2007. (Petitioner's exhibit 203). The revenue shortfall to cover the
property taxes from 2003 through 2007 was $22,052. ($59,552.00 in property taxes owed
versus $37,500.00 in rents received). (R. p. 563). Charlie did not pay any of the shortfall.
The district court in its Opinion on Appeal cited Petitioner's exhibits 75 and 249
to establish the rental revenue received. (R. p. 421). However, Petitioner's exhibit 225
adjusts the rents and the rent received from 2006 through 2011 was $11,583.00 per year.
The 2012 rent was also $11,583.00. (R. p. 563). Given the revenue shortfall to cover the
property taxes, as well as additional expenses incurred in regard to the Salt Lake Property,
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including attorney's fees to renegotiate the lease with Clear Channel in the amount of
$27,173.00, Preliminary Wetlands Study in the amount of $6,500.00, Surveys in the
amount of $10,000.00, none of which Charlie paid for or objected to by filing a motion
with the court as she was entitled to do (R. p. 561 ). The magistrate court erred in entering
a Judgment against Ballard for $112,250.00 and making Ballard responsible for all tax
penalties given Charlie's clear violation of court orders by failing to pay her one-half
share. The district court erred in affirming the $112,250.00 Judgment.
Further, the district court erred in considering rental income that was received
after the sale of the BZW property in 2013 as the magistrate court concluded in addition
to the $112,250.00, Charlie was entitled to one-half of the net rents received. In other
words, Charlie received a double recovery and avoided her court ordered liability for onehalf of the property taxes. Finally, it was not Ballard that sold the real property to BZW
Investments, it was a separate legal entity (e.g. S & R Realty, LLC). Clearly, the
Judgment against Ballard for one-half of the sale as well as making the real estate
commission and tax penalties his sole obligation should be vacated.
VI.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE MAGISTRATE COURT'S
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS AGAINST BALLARD
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE§ 12-121

In Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 132 P.3d 392 (2016), the Idaho Supreme
Court held:
The district judge awarded Thomas attorney fees pursuant to Idaho
Code § 12-121. For an award of attorney fees under that statute to be
appropriate, Madsen's entire defense of this action would have to have
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been frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. McGrew v. McGrew,
139 Idaho 551, 82 P.3d 8933 (2003). If there is a legitimate, triable issue
of fact or a legitimate issue of law, attorney fees may not be awarded under
this statute even though the losing party has asserted factual or legal
claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Id. An
award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 must be supported by
adequate findings which, in tum, are supported by the record. Id. We
review a trial court's award of attorney fees under the statute under an
abuse-of-discretion standard. Callaghan v. Callaghan, 142 Idaho 185, 125
P.3d 1061 (2005). (Emphasis added).
142 Idaho at 639. See also, Phillipe v. Blazier-Henry. 154 Idaho 724, 302 P.2d 349
(2013) where the Idaho Supreme Court held:
When deciding whether attorney fees should be awarded under LC.§
12-121, the "entire course of the litigation must be taken into account and
if there is at least one legitimate issue presented, attorney fees may not be
awarded even though the losing party has asserted other factual or legal
claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Michalk,
148 Idaho at 235, 220 P.3d at 591. (Emphasis added).
154 Idaho at 731 . While an award of attorney's fees and costs is discretionary, the
magistrate could only consider whether Ballard's entire defense of Charlie's Second
Amended Petition to Modify Order Pursuant to Rule 809 filed on January 25, 2017. The
district court committed error when it affirmed the magistrate court's award of attorney's
fees to Charlie pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 when it ruled as follows:
The magistrate also did not abuse its discretion in finding that the
appellant's conduct was in violation of the court orders, which culminated
in the respondent seeking her petitions to modify. The appellant is correct
that this was not a contempt action but ifhe had complied with the terms
of the court's orders, the disposition of this property would not have taken
more than ten years to accomplish and his opposition to the sale of the
property, which includes his assertions of arguments that are without
foundation, provide a reasonable basis for the magistrate's attorney fee
award.
(R. p. 429). The magistrate court clearly abused its discretion when it ruled as follows:
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F. Attorney Fees and Costs.
Despite his stipulations and judicial admissions, Ballard's course of
conduct, as outlined in this document, has been to achieve sole ownership
of the SLC Property. This course of conduct has been in clear violation of
the 2007 Order and the 2008 Order. Ballard's current attempts to
collaterally attack his own stipulations and judicial admissions are
frivolous, unreasonable, and without legal foundation. The Court is left
with the abiding belief this matter was pursued frivolously, unreasonably
and without foundation. Charlie is clearly the prevailing party in this
current litigation. Pursuant to I.R.F.L.P. 908 and Idaho Code§ 12-121 ,
Charlie is awarded her attorney fees and costs in pursuing this matter.
(R. p. 308). Judge Day ruled on the record on April 20, 2007 that the magistrate court
had no jurisdiction over the Salt Lake Property and that the Salt Lake Property was not
community property because it was owned by a separate corporation (e.g. Sun Mountain
Broadcasting, Inc.), but that the court had jurisdiction over the Sun Mountain
Broadcasting, Inc. stock. (R. p. 489, p. 3, L. 34 - p. 4, L. 1). The magistrate court
recognized Judge Day's ruling concluding as a matter of law as follows:
The Court clearly had jurisdiction to divide the community portion of
the SMB stock between Ballard and Charlie. This is exactly what
occurred in 2007, pursuant to the express stipulation of the parties.
(Emphasis added).
(R. p. 304). The magistrate court recognized Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. as the
owner of the Salt Lake Property yet for whatever reason, the magistrate court and the
district court did not differentiate between the Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. stock and
the real property it owned. The community portion of the stock, if any, is the asset that
was the subject of the 2007 Stipulation, not the Salt Lake Property, over which Judge Day
correctly ruled the court has no jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is clearly a legitimate issue of
law that was raised by Ballard. Further, it is an issue that must be determined before a
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judgment can be modified pursuant to I.R.F.L.P. 809.5. See Fix v. Fix, 125 Idaho 372,
870 P.2d 1331 (1993) where the Idaho Supreme Court held:
In limited circumstances, a property division may be modified contrary
to the bar ofresjudicata using I.R.C.P. 60(b). See Harper v. Harper, 122
Idaho 535, 537,835 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Ct.App. 1992). See also Allen v.
Allen, 645 P.2d 774, 776 (Alaska 1982); In re Marriage ofParks, 48
Wash.App. 166, 737 P.2d 1316, 1319 (1987) (stating that a motion under
rule 60(b) is "ancillary to or a continuation of the original suit" and so long
as the Court had jurisdiction originally, jurisdiction continues for purposes
of rule 60(b)); Harshfield v. Harshfield, 842 P.2d 535, 538 (Wyo. 1992).
(Emphasis added).
125 Idaho at 376.
Another issue that should have been a major concern to the district court was the
following provision contained in the Order Re: Receiver Duties:
3. TRANSFER OF TITLE. The Property is currently held by S&R
Realty, LLC, a Utah limited liability company (S&R Realty"). The
Respondent ("Ballard") shall transfer, by recording an appropriate deed in
the County Records of Salt Lake City County, within two (2) days after the
reinstatement or re-establishment of B&C Realty, LLC, an Idaho LLC, the
Salt Lake City Property, as described in the legal description set forth in
Exhibit A ("the Property") from S&R Realty, LLC (or current title holder
if different) to B&C Realty, LLC. In the event Ballard fails to execute the
deed within the time frame noted above, the Receiver shall execute a deed
on his behalf pursuant to I.R.F.L.P. 821. (Emphasis added).
(R. p. 584). The magistrate court had no jurisdiction to directly affect title to the Salt
Lake Property. Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455, 461 , 680 P.2d 1355 (1984). This is
clear black letter law. Despite the magistrate court's lack of jurisdiction to directly affect
title to the Salt Lake Property, the magistrate court empowered the Receiver it appointed
to convey the Salt Lake Property from S & R Realty, LLC to B & C Realty, LLC.
(Appendix A). The magistrate court also gave the Receiver authority to . .. "exclusively
manage, control and operate all aspects of the Property and B & C Realty, LLC. (R. p.
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586). Finally, the magistrate court retained jurisdiction over B & C Realty, LLC. (R. p.
590). Judge Day ruled the court had no jurisdiction over the Salt Lake Property or the
acts ofB & C Realty, LLC. (R. p. 491 , p. 13, L. 25 - p. 14, L. 2). Pursuant to Idaho Code
§ 30-25-702, only the district court has the jurisdiction to wind up the affairs of an Idaho
limited liability company including the appointment of a receiver. Clearly there are
legitimate issues of law that Ballard raised before the magistrate court. 16
Further, the magistrate court made findings in regard to Ballard's "course of
conduct" and violations of the 2007 and 2008 Orders in making its determination to
award attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121. In doing so, the magistrate court
abused its discretion by considering factors that are not relevant to the determination of
whether to award attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121. In Easterling v.
Kendall, 159 Idaho 902, 367 P.3d 1214 (2016), the Idaho Supreme Court held:
"To determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion, this Court
considers whether the district court: (1) perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion
consistent with applicable legal standards; and (3) reached its decision
through the exercise ofreason." Hansen v. Roberts, 154 Idaho 469, 472,
299 P.3d 781, 784 (2013).
367 P.3d at 1221. The legal standard to determine whether attorney's fees should be
awarded pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 is whether Ballard's defense was frivolous,
unreasonable or without foundation. The magistrate court acted outside the boundaries of

16

The district court ruled that Ballard did not raise certain issues before the magistrate court, including the
Utah Statute of Frauds, and therefore, the issue would not be considered for the first time on appeal. (R.p.
374) First, the issue is jurisdictional, so it can be raised at any time. Second, the issue regarding the Utah
Statute of Frauds was raised before the magistrate court. (T.p. 613 L. 24 - P. 615 L. 11 ).
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its discretion by using legal standards that were not applicable (e.g. Ballard's conduct).
Finally, the magistrate court abused its discretion by failing to consider the entire
course of litigation. For almost three and one half years, Charlie's sole cause of action
was for the court to order an appraisal of the Salt Lake Property and have the magistrate
court enter an order requiring Ballard to pay her one-half of the appraised value. (R. pp.
230 - 231 ). Three months prior to trial, Charlie filed her Second Amended Petition that
requested the appointment of a receiver, in the alternative, and a money judgment for the
sale of a portion of the Salt Lake Property. (R. pp. 280 - 282). On the second day of
trial, Charlie dismissed her claim for the: property to be appraised and for Ballard to be
required to pay her one-half of the appraised value. (T. p . 176, LL 2 - 7). Despite the fact
that Ballard prevailed on the claim Charlie had been pursuing during the entire course of
litigation, including the first day of trial, the magistrate court awarded Charlie attorney's
fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121. This ruling was a clear abuse of discretion as
Charlie did not prevail on all causes of action that she plead.
The district court clearly erred when it affirmed the magistrate court's award of
attorney's fees against Ballard and as such, the Judgment for Attorney's Fees and Costs
filed July 16, 2018 should be dismissed.

VII.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE MAGISTRATE
COURT'S AWARD OF COSTS TO CHARLIE
A.

The district court erred when it affirmed the magistrate court's award of
discretionary costs.
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Rule 901.B. of the Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure provides in part as
follows:
D. Discretionary costs. Additional items of cost not enumerated in,
or in an amount in excess of that listed in subparagraph C, may be allowed
upon a showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional costs
reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed
against the adverse party. The trial court, in ruling upon objections to such
discretionary costs contained in the memorandum of costs, shall make
express findings as to why such specific item of discretionary cost should
or should not be allowed. 17
In Easterling v. Kendall, 159 Idaho 902,367 P.3d 1214 (2016), the Idaho Supreme Court
held:
Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(D), "[a] trial court may,
in its discretion, award a prevailing party certain costs where there has
been a showing that the costs are necessary and exceptional, reasonably
incurred, and should in the interests ofjustice be assessed against the
adverse party." Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307,
314, 109 P.3d 161, 168 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
party opposing an award of discretionary costs bears the burden of
demonstrating that the district court abused its discretion. Id. To survive
appeal, an award of discretionary costs must include "[e]xpress findings as
to the general character of requested costs and whether such costs were
necessary, reasonable, exceptional, and in the interests of justice." Id
(Emphasis added).
367 P.3d at 1229. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D) is identical to I.R.F.L.P. 901.D. The magistrate
court failed to make any findings in its Order Re: Petitioner's Attorney Fees and Costs
filed July 5, 2018 regarding discretionary costs simply ruling in part as follows:
The attorney' fees and costs incurred by Petitioner in this matter by
Rebecca Anderson and Mackenzie Whatcott are reasonable and necessary.
A close review of the fees charged reflects there are no duplicative
attorney fee charges. In order to protect her rights, it was necessary for
17

The district court erroneously ruled Ballard failed to apply the abuse of discretion factors to the
magistrate court's award and that this constituted a waiver. R. p. 430. The issue was clearly raised and
argued in Appellant's Brief regarding the magistrate court abusing its discretion by awarding discretionary
costs without making any findings pursuant to I.R.F.L.P. 90 J.B. (Aug. pp. 213 - 214).
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Petitioner to thoroughly pursue this matter. It is therefore ordered that
Petitioner is awarded her attorney fees and costs in the amounts set forth
by MacKenzie Whatcott, Rebecca Anderson, and Todd Jensen. She is also
awarded the costs set forth in her declaration filed on April 5, 2018.
(Aug. p. 159). The magistrate court's failure to make findings prior to awarding
discretionary costs is a clear abuse of discretion as the law clearly requested findings that
the discretional fees were exceptional and in the interests ofjustice, and the district court
erred when it affirmed the award of discretionary costs by the magistrate court.
Unfortunately, Charlie failed to itemize what she was claiming in regard to costs
as a matter of right and those costs that she was claiming as discretionary in her
Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs stating:
The remaining costs, both in Exhibit B and those addressed below and
attached to the Declaration of Charlie Smith are discretionary with the
Court.
(Aug. p. 17). The total costs claimed appears to be $21,491.54. (Aug. p. 17). The
discretionary costs appear to be as follows:

Larry Rigby (expert) did not testify at trial or in a
deposition therefore not a cost as a matter of right
(I.R.F.L.P. 901.C.8)
Kerry Jorgenson (expert who testified at trial)
Tom Hopkins (expert) did not testify at trial or in
a deposition therefore not a cost as a matter of
right (I.R.F.L.P. 901.C.8)
Jared Booth (testified at trial as a fact witness
T. p. 261, LI. 4 - 10)
First American Title
Divol & Associates
TOTAL:
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$ 2,500.00
$ 2,468.52

$ 2,200.00
$ 5,597.74
$ 500.00
$ 591.92
$13,858.18

In addition, there were discretionary costs in Exhibit B to Memorandum of Attorneys
Fees filed April 5, 2018 (Aug. pp. 68 - 69) and $1 ,170.21 in discretionary costs claimed
by Todd Jensen (Aug. p. 12).
None of the above discretionary costs should have been awarded by the magistrate
as no findings were made as required by I.R.F.L.P. 901.D. The district court clearly erred
in affirming them on appeal. The district court's ruling in regard to discretionary costs
should be reversed and the magistrate court's award of discretionary costs vacated.
B.

The district court erred when it affirmed the magistrate court's clear abuse of
discretion in allowing three (3) separate Memorandum of Costs filed on behalf of
Charlie.
Rule 905 of the Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure provides:

Rule 905. Memorandum of Costs.
At any time after the verdict of a jury or a decision of the court, any
party who claims costs may file and serve on adverse parties ~
memorandum of costs, itemizing each claimed expense, but such
memorandum of costs may not be filed later than fourteen ( 14) days after
entry of judgment. Such memorandum must state that to the best of the
party's knowledge and belief the items are correct and that the costs
claimed are in compliance with this rule. Failure to file such
memorandum of costs within the period prescribed by this rule shall be a
waiver of the right of costs. A memorandum of costs prematurely filed
shall be considered as timely. (Emphasis added).
The district court ruled as follows:
The rule does not specify a precise limit on the number of
memorandums of cost, nor does it specifically prohibit different law firms
performing work on the same case for a party from submitting separate
memorandums of cost.
(R. p. 431). Cambridge Academic Content Dictionary defines "a" as:
Used before a noun to a single thing or person that has not been mentioned
before.
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Cambridge University Press 2019. I.R.F.L.P. 905 does specify one (1) Memorandum of
Costs. I.R.F.L.P. 908.D. contemplates an affidavit of each attorney that is claiming
attorney's fees as costs. In the Memorandum for Attorney's Fees and Costs filed on behalf
of Charlie by Makenzie Whatcott, the Memorandum requested $113,421.50 in attorney's
fees to be awarded to Charlie. (Aug. p. 20). The other Memorandums contradicted this
amount.

It should further be noted that I.R.F.L.P. 905 requires that Charlie was required to
file a Memorandum of Costs itemizing each claimed expense and that failure to file such
a memorandum . . . "shall be a waiver of the right of costs." It is impossible to itemize
each claimed expense in a litigation using three (3) separate memorandums of costs.
Each item of costs should have been itemized under the appropriate subsection of
I.R.F.L.P. 901 (e.g. Costs as a Matter of Right 901.C., Discretionary Costs 901.D., Costs
and Attorney Fees 901.F., etc.). Charlie failed to do this and therefore, she waived her
right of costs. The magistrate court abused its discretion by considering three (3)
memorandums of costs that did not comply with I.R.F.L.P. 905. Further, the district court
erred when it affirmed the magistrate court's failure to act within the boundaries of the
law. The district court's decision should be reversed and the Judgment for Attorney's
Fees and Costs filed July 16, 2018 vacated. (R. p. 334).
VIII.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED CHARLIE
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL
The district court primarily awarded Charlie attorney's fees and costs on appeal on
the grounds that Ballard's primary basis for his appeal was that the magistrate court did
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not have ".. . jurisdiction over the Salt Lake Property due to ownership and community
property issues, which had long ago been decided in this case and which were not
appealed from." (R. p. 435). The district court found this to be frivolous. (R. p. 435).
With regard to the Salt Lake Property, the district court is correct. The ownership
and community property issues were decided at the hearing on April 20, 2007 when
Judge Day ruled that the Salt Lake Property was owned by Sun Mountain Broadcasting,
Inc. and that the Salt Lake Property was not owned as community property. (R. p. 20, LL
17 - 21). Judge Day ruled the magistrate court did not have jurisdiction to divide the Salt
Lake Property. This ruling made any subsequent Order that was specific to the Salt Lake
Property void for lack of jurisdiction. There has never been an adjudication that the Salt
Lake Property was community property.
Ballard legitimately raised the issue as to the magistrate court's jurisdiction to
enter the 2007 and 2008 Orders. Judge Day's ruling and the Idaho Supreme Court support
Ballard's argument that the magistrate court had no jurisdiction to modify an Order that
the magistrate court did not have jurisdiction to enter originally. As argued above, the
magistrate court was required to determine whether it had jurisdiction to enter the 2007
and 2008 Orders prior to considering Charlie's Second Amended Petition to Modify.
Since Judge Day had already ruled that the magistrate court had no jurisdiction over the
Salt Lake Property, the current magistrate should have sua sponte dismissed Charlie's
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Second Amended Petition to Modify Pursuant to Rule 809. 18 Further, Ballard never
stipulated the stock he acquired in Sun Mountain Broadcasting, which the magistrate
court found he acquired prior to marriage, (R. p. 292, finding 2) was community property.
The district court clearly abused its discretion when it awarded Charlie attorney's
fees on appeal as Ballard raised good faith legal arguments. Easterling v. Kendall, 159
Idaho 902,367 P.3d 1214 (2016).
IX.

BALLARD IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND COSTS ON APPEAL
Ballard should be awarded attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Rules
40 and 41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules and Idaho Code § 12-121. There has never been a
jurisdictional basis for Charlie's Second Amended Petition to Modify Pursuant to Rule
809 as that Petition seeks relief solely as to the Salt Lake Property which was owned by a
third party on the date of the parties' divorce. The magistrate court found the 2007
Stipulation was solely as to the "community portion" of the Sun Mountain Broadcasting,
Inc. stock. (R. p. 304). The parties could not confer jurisdiction on the court to the Salt
Lake Property in the 2007 Stipulation by law. As such, there is no foundation upon
which Charlie has a defense to Ballard's appeal. Judge Day ruled the magistrate court had
no jurisdiction over the Salt Lake Property on April 20, 2007 because it was owned by a

18

The magistrate court concluded as a matter of law as follows:
The Court clearly had jurisdiction to divide the community portion of the SMB stock between
Ballard and Charlie. This is exactly what occurred in 2007, pursuant to the express stipulation of
the parties.
(R. p. 304). The stock was the subject of the April 20, 2007 Stipulation, not the Salt Lake Property. The
stock represents ownership of Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. which owned the Salt Lake Property at the
time of the divorce.
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third party. He further ruled the magistrate court had no jurisdiction over the activities of
B & C Realty, LLC.
CONCLUSION
Idaho Code§ 32-906 defines community property as .. . property acquired after
marriage by husband and wife. Ballard and Charlie never acquired real property located
in the state of Utah during their marriage. Therefore, it was impossible for the Salt Lake
Property to be community property. Further, Ballard acquired his interest in the stock to
Sun Mountain Broadcasting, Inc. prior to his marriage to Charlie making that stock his
separate property. There has never been an adjudication regarding the character of the
stock.
Regardless, Charlie's Second Amended Petition to Modify Pursuant to Rule 809
was filed solely as to the Salt Lake Property which was not community property.
Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 32-712, the magistrate court only has jurisdiction to divide
community property. Pringle v. Pringle, 109 Idaho 1026, 712 P.2d 727 (App. 1985).
Based upon the arguments herein, the district court's decision affirming the Judgments
entered by the magistrate court should be reversed, the Judgments vacated and Charlie's
Second Amended Petition to Modify dismissed.

7H
DATED this--11.__ day of December,

;L

Derek A. Pica
Attorney for Respondent / Appellant
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APPENDIX A
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4/18/201811:33:00AM $12.00
Book - 10666 Pg - 1251-1252
ADAM GARDINER
Recorder, Salt Lake County, UT
HIRSCHI BAER & CLAYTON PLLC
BY: eCASH, DEPUTY - EF 2 P.

After recording return to:
Steven D. Severn
SEVERN WINKLE, LLP
205 N. 10th Street, Suite 300
PO Box2833
Boise, Idaho 83701

WARRANTY DEED
S & R Realty, LLC an Utah limited liability company, GRANTOR, whose ad~ress is:
3317 Shaggy Mane Lane, McCall, Idaho 83638, hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS to:
B & C Realty, LLC,.an Idaho. limitedJiahility...company., as.GH.A.NTEE,..wh9se. addr~ss is:
9410 N. Winterwood Lane, Boise, Idaho 83714, for the sum of Ten and 00/100 Dollars and other
good and valuable consideration, the following described tract of land in Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, more particularly described as follows:
See attached Exhibit A.
WITNESS the hand of said Grantor, this~ day of April, 2018
S & R Realty, ~L<;,
an Utah limited liability comi;>any
By:
Steven D. Severn, Court Appointed Receiver
Pursuant to Order Re: Receiver Duties
dated March 23, 2018, Case No. CV-DR-2005-2342
in the Fourth Judicial District, State ofldaho for the
County of Ada
STATE OF IDAHO )
:ss
COUNTY OF ADA )

.l1D._

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this
day of April, 2018, by
Steven D. Severn, who is known to me personally, or who proved his identity by valid state
identification, who executed this Warranty Deed in his capacity as Court Appointed Receiver for
S & R Realty, LLC, a Utah limited liability' company.
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Exhibit A

BEGINNING AT A POINT NORTH 89°68'20" WEST 241.20 FEET ALONG THE SECTION
LINE AND SOUTH 32.99 FEET AND NORTH 89°58'16" WEST 34.07 FEET FROM THE
EAST CORNER OF SECTION 15, TOWNSHIP 1 NORTH, RANGE 1 WEST, SALT LAKE
BASE AND MERIDIAN; AND RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 04°02'4 l" WEST 118.87 FEET;
THENCE SOUTH 01°53'23" WEST 227.93 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 07°59'03" EAST 231.22
FEET; THENCE SOUTH 31°00'46" WEST 460.53 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 16°13'26" EAST
152.99 FEET; THENCE NORTH 89°54'41" WEST 745.88 FEET; THENCE NORTH 00°0 l '18"
EAST 344.50 FEET; THENCE NORTH 89°54'41" WEST 165.00 FEET; THENCE SOUTH
00°01'18" WEST 344.50 FEET; THENCE NORTH 89°54'41" WEST 963.21 FEET; THENCE
NORTH 03°51'10" EAST 1,117.58 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 89°58'16" EAST 1,977.28 FEET
TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING.
Containing 48.6468 Acres.
Tax parcel number. 08-15-426-009-0000
Address for Notice Purposes: 1540 West 2300 North, Salt Lake City, Utah
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FILED EFFECTIVE

CERTIFICATE OF ORGANIZATION
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
Title 30, Chapters 21 and 25, Idaho Code

2018 HAR 23 AH ID: 51

Base Filing fee: $100.00 typed, $120 not typed

SECRETARY OF STATE

Complete and submit the application in duplicate.

1.

STATE OF IDAHO

The name of the limited liability company is:

B&C Realty, LLC
(R ememb€r to include !he words ' Limitied liabl!ily Company." "li!lli!ed Company, 'or the, abhn,-,iatior.s l..L.C .. Ll..C, or LC)

2.

The complete street and mailing addresses of the principal office is:

9410 N. Winterwood Lane, Boise, ID 83714

(M ailing Address, ii c!iffe,entj

3.

The name and complete street address of the registered agent:

Charlie M Smith

9410 N Winterwood Lane, Boise, ID 83714

( amei

4.

The name and address of at least one governor of the limited liability company:

Charlie M Smith

9410 N Winterwood Lane, Boise, ID 83714

(· aniP.J

(Addres~i

Ballard F Smith

P.O. Box 56, McCall, ID 83638

,1 i ame.

(Addre53)

(Addr;,;;;;)

Name

5.

(Addn1ss}

Mailing address for future correspondence (annual report notices):

9410 N Winterwood Lane, Boise, ID 83714
{Addr.;ss}

Signature of organizer(s).
Secretary of State use only

Printed Name:
Signature:

Charlie M Smith

(]/.£/bf/ti q-i,~J2l
{ P};4~-Sm (tif«

Printed Name:
Signature:
Rev. 0112018

---------------

ID}.KO SECRETARY OF ST}.TE

03/23/2018 05:00
CK: 108 1 CT:19412 7 BH: 1 634015

18 100 . 00 = 100 . 00 ORGAN LLC #2
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